There are several mechanisms in human societies that help supporting cooperation. Gossiping, for instance, allows to identify defectors who can then be punished via ostracism. However, the evolutionary stability of gossip might be undermined by the fact that it is more error-prone that direct observation, whereas ostracism could be ineffective if the partner selection mechanism is not robust. The aim of this work is to investigate the conditions under which the combination of gossip and ostracism might support cooperation in groups of different sizes. We are also interested in exploring the extent to which errors in transmission might undermine the reliability of gossip as a mechanism for identifying defectors. Our results show that a large quantity of gossip is necessary to support cooperation, and that group structure can mitigate the effects of errors in transmission.
II. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation among individuals is essential for their survival, in human and animal societies. Human beings are an intrinsically social species and most of our evolutionary success can be attributed to our highly developed ability to cooperate with each other. This ability is especially important in groups, where individuals need to coordinate their actions in order to achieve personal benefits that cannot be obtained without cooperation. However, those who do not contribute but reap the collective benefits are better off than cooperators. When cooperation is framed as a Public Goods Game (PGG) [1, 2] , and individuals interact with complete strangers with little or no opportunities for future re-encounters, cooperation can hardly be sustained, unless costly punishment is provided [3, 4] . Although effective in many contexts, punishment increases the amount of cooperation but not the average pay-off of the group [5] , and in repeated games cooperators who do not bear the costs of punishing defectors are better off than cooperators who punish [6] .
As an alternative to directly reducing defectors' pay-offs, different mechanisms have been proposed to sustain cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Ostracism, defined as being ignored or excluded by another individual or group of individuals [7] , is effective in promoting cooperative behaviours, favouring investments in the collective goods and maintaining social order [8, 9] . Ostracism has negative consequences for individuals well-being [10] , and neuroscientific evidence shows that social rejection activates the same brain areas activated by physical pain [11] . MaierRigaud and colleagues [12] show that in laboratory experiments, participants in a PGG with ostracism opportunities were able to increase contribution levels and, unlike monetary punishment, ostracism also had a significant positive effect on net earnings.
Ostracism allows to isolate non-cooperators, but for their identification another mechanism is needed. Gossip, i.e., the exchange of value-laden information about an absent third party [13] , can be very useful to get to know potential partners without paying the costs of interacting with non-cooperators. Thanks to gossip, we can map our social group [14] , learn about its rules [15] , and enforce social norms [16] , among other things. Gossip is crucial to make information about potential partners travel within the network, thus allowing for identification of defectors [17] . In human societies, gossip and ostracism are tightly linked. In groups and small-scale societies, ostracism can result from being negatively gossiped about [16, [18] [19] [20] , and a combination of these two mechanisms could effectively support cooperation. In a lab experiment, Feinberg and colleagues showed that gossip allowed for identification of defectors, who were consequentially ostracised by their group mates [21] . Ostracism was effective also at the collective level, because after an initial shrinking of group earnings, the collective good was restored at the end of the game. Similarly, in a computational model, gossipers who could actively select their group members and avoid ill-reputed agents were able to outperform free-riders and punishers in groups of 25 agents, whereas in smaller groups the combination of gossiping and material punishment was more successful in increasing cooperation levels [22] . However, the evolutionary stability of gossip in supporting cooperation has been questioned. According to Nowak and Sigmund [23] , one of the main limitations of gossip consists in its being unreliable, while Ohtsuki, Iwasa and Nowak [6] assume that errors in observing interactions, and the resulting unreliable reputations, inevitably cause indirect reciprocity to collapse. In models of indirect reciprocity [24] [25] [26] , information about others is acquired either via direct observation, or via reputational rankings of partners in dyadic interactions, the so-called "image score". Image score is effective in supporting cooperation, but pro-social reputations are evolutionary stable only if they track behaviour with the same accuracy as direct experience [27] . Cooperation becomes fragile when errors are possible, that is, when there is an even small probability for an individual to record a good partner as a bad one or vice-versa [28] . This is more likely to happen when reputation is circulated through gossiping. In fact, when reporting information about someone, it is possible to misreport his/her reputation in two opposite directions. A cooperator can be considered as a cheater, and then excluded from the interaction, or a defector could be erroneously included among cooperators. We term the former an exclusion error, while the latter is an inclusion error and we included both in our model, in order to investigate their respective effects on cooperation. When unreliable gossip is paired with ostracism, this can lead either to ostracism against innocent cooperators or to acceptance of unrecognised defectors, with possibly different effects at the system level.
The aim of this study is to explore whether and under what conditions cooperation can evolve when gossip and ostracism are combined. In our model, agents playing a PGG on a bipartite graph can actively select their partners on the basis of gossip information received. In this work, we are interested in testing whether gossip as a basis for ostracism would work in supporting cooperation in a PGG on a bi-partite graph. We show that increasing amounts of gossip could help cooperators in finding and rejecting defectors, and that this positive effect would be reinforced by the structure of the interaction. Embedding agents into a bipartite graph is an effective partner selection mechanism and leads to a significant increase in cooperation. Nevertheless, when unreliable gossip was introduced in the system, failing to exclude a defector was more detrimental to cooperation than erroneously ostracising a cooperator. This effect was amplified by the interaction structure, because in the bi-partite graph defectors were accepted by different groups despite their anti-social behaviour.
III. THE MODEL
We consider a population of L individuals placed on a bipartite graph [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] , that is, a network containing two kinds of nodes denoting agents and groups, respectively. This implies that links can be established only between nodes of different types whereas no direct connection among individual agents is possible. Thus, such a bipartite representation gives more prominence to group structure, than to individuals' network. As an illustration, two individuals belonging to the same three groups are "more" connected than two other individuals who share the membership of a single group, so that in this way it is possible to take into account also the quality and the weight of the connections (indeed, a similar result can be obtained by means of weighted networks, which however do not represent explicitly the group structure [34] underlying the network). In a bipartite graph the mesoscopic level of the interactions is better depicted [33, 35] than in a classical one-mode network.
Network building -The network building proceeds as follows: given a value F ∈ (0, 1), we set nF initial members for each group so that each individual belongs exclusively to one group. As an illustration, consider the case with L = 150, n = 20 and F = 0.75 (then M = 10). This would mean that we have 15 agents in the first group, other 15 in the second one and so on until the last group is formed. Then, each group must be completed with a subset (1 − F )n = 5 of individuals selected from a pool of available candidates. Potential partners are randomly selected from the remaining population, but they become members of that group if and only if group members have, on average, a non-negative reputation σ of potential candidates. Reputations are expressed by means of integers: in general, σ(x, y) is the reputation that the individual y has to x's eyes. Whenever an agent i interacts with an agent j during a PGG stage, their respective reputations are updated. If j has cooperated, σ(i, j) is increased by 1, otherwise is decreased by 1. This process is bilateral, thus the same happens to the other agent's record σ(j, i) of j about i. There is no maximum nor minimum limit to the possible values that σ(i, j) can assume. Direct experience is also complemented by information exchanged during gossip phases (for details, see the description of the Gossip stage below). If there is nobody in the whole population with a non-negative average reputation, new members are accepted regardless of their standing.
L individuals are distributed into M groups, each group composed of n members playing a sequence of PGG and gossip phases. Each and every individual i is characterized by an innate strategy s i , which can be either cooperation (C), or defection (D). Moreover, each agent has private information about other individuals' reputation, on the basis of direct interaction and reported information.
Initial conditions -At the onset of the simulation, strategies are randomly assigned to players, therefore we have on average 50% of cooperators and 50% of defectors. Reputations are set equal to zero: σ in (i, j) = 0 ∀i, j.
Dynamics -The dynamics consist of g p phases, each phase characterized by the combination of a game round followed by a gossip round. In PGG rounds, cooperators contribute a quantity c > 0, whereas defectors contribute nothing. The total contribution in each group is multiplied by a factor nB and equally shared among all group members, regardless of individual contributions. Each agent plays as many PGGs as the number of groups it belongs to, and the total fitness of a player is the sum of the pay-offs gained in each of its groups, with B = 0.85 and c = 1 as in the work by Suzuki and Akiyama [36] .
Gossip stage -In the gossip stage, agents interact in pairs where the first one, i, acts as the "speaker" and the second, j, as the "listener". The target of gossip is a third player l whose reputation σ(i, l) is communicated by i to j. The reputation of l is updated by averaging j's original knowledge with the newest:
Imperfect information -Since information transmission is prone to errors of several origins going from noise to opportunistic deception, we enriched the model by including two different kinds of errors. The first ones are called exclusion errors, which make cooperative individuals have a negative reputations, and inclusion errors, which make defectors have positive reputations. Exclusion errors are implemented as follows: if σ(i, l) > 0, that is, if l has a good reputation according to i, there is a probability q α that reputation transmission is wrong and the receiver, j understands the opposite of what is told, so that
On the contrary, we have an inclusion error when l has a negative reputation to i, and there is a probability q β that j understands l is a cooperator, so that
In this work we always assume that q α · q β = 0, that is, both can be equal to zero but at most one of them can be positive. This procedure is repeated 2νL times, so that each player happens to be on average ν times a speaker and ν times a listener. Here, we always assume ν = 50.
New group members are selected before each of the g p game rounds. Let us notice that if g p = 1, then gossip has no effect on the dynamics of the population.
Reproduction -After g p game-gossip phases, the reproduction stage takes place [36] . Individuals are randomly selected in pairs and a new individual is created which with probability P = 0.9 inherits the strategy of the parent with the highest fitness, otherwise inherits the strategy of the less performing parent. The parents are put again in the original population, and offspring is stored in another pool. When this selection process has happened L times, the old population is deleted and replaced with the offspring. The offspring inherits only the parents' strategy, while the reputations σ(i, j) are again set to zero. Each new generation repeats the g p game-gossip phases, after which another reproduction stage takes place. The simulation goes on for t generations, until a final steady configuration is reached by the system. Depending on the parameter values chosen, the number of generations needed to reach such final state can go from few tens to about one hundred.
In Figure 1 a summary of the main parameters of the model is reported, together with a visual description of the algorithm. The variables of interest for understanding the effects of gossip and ostracism on cooperation are the average cooperator density ρ (i.e., the fraction of agents adopting the strategy C in the population), and the average reputation S. This variable refers to the average value over the entire population of the average score each agent has of the others:
In general, such quantities evolve in time (i.e., through generations), so that we specify them as ρ(t) and S(t). Also their final values ρ ∞ and S ∞ , that is, the values assumed in the final state, will be taken into consideration in the following description of results.
In large groups, cooperation goes to 1 when gossip is abundant (g p = 5). Figure 2 shows the final density of cooperators as a function of the fraction of fixed members in PGG groups, F , for two different values of n and g p = 5. Cooperation levels dramatically decrease as F increases, that is, when there are less opportunities for partner choice. In particular, for n = 4 and F ≥ 0.75 cooperators are driven to extinction, whilst for smaller values of F they are able to completely invade the system. In the baseline version of the model, without partner choice (F = 1) and only one gossip exchange (g p = 1), cooperative behaviours get rapidly extinct for both small and large group size after very few generations, and the average reputation (as already stated, completely irrelevant for the evolution of the system) is negative.
Partner selection and gossip with perfect information
If we include the possibility of partner selection (i.e., by setting F < 1), without gossip (i.e., keeping g p = 1), each group will be formed by nF fixed members which choose the needed n(1 − F ) at each round of the game. As we can observe in Fig. 3 , also in this case cooperation goes to zero at the end of the dynamics, even though less swiftly than in the previous modality with F = 1.. The evolution of cooperation depends strongly on both n and g p , as shown in Figure 4 . Increasing both group size and the number of gossip stages makes cooperation thrive: the more individuals exchange information, the better they know each other so that they are able to avoid defectors when completing their own group in the PGG stages. Therefore, even though in a single PGG defectors might gain more than cooperators, if there is enough information flowing, defectors are quickly isolated, therefore they can play in fewer groups and gain lower payoffs.
The amount of gossip exchanged plays a crucial role in supporting cooperation. Figure 5 shows the behaviour of the final cooperator density as a function of n for L = 200, F = 0.5, and three different values of g p . Without gossip, cooperation cannot be sustained for any value of n, but when there are enough gossip phases (in particular, g p = 5), cooperation survives already for n ≥ 3. The emergence of cooperation is mirrored also in average reputation. Average reputation converges to a negative value when cooperation gets extinct, and to a positive one when cooperators invade the system (see Figure 6) .
In summary, when there is not enough gossip to support partner selection (g p = 1), cooperation gets always extinct for any group size; on the other hand, as the number of gossip exchanges increases, the probability of invasion by cooperators increases as well.
Partner selection and gossip with transmission errors
The efficacy of gossip in supporting cooperation is limited by its reliability, but less is known about the effect of specific kinds of errors. In a situation in which the listener can misunderstand what the speaker says, there are two possible outcomes. An exclusion error occurs when, with probability q α , a gossip targets a player with positive reputation which is understood as negative by the listener. In a complementary way, an inclusion error refers to the probability q β that a player with negative reputation is mistakenly considered a cooperator.
Exclusion errors
Exclusion errors do not prevent cooperators to outcompete defectors for n = 20, and do not affect survival of contributors up to almost q α = 0.5 for n = 4 ( Figure 7 ). This can be explained by the fact that in partner selection excluding defectors is essential, therefore, even if also some cooperators are excluded with q α > 0, defectors are rejected as usual. In this sense we could say that the Latin motto "in dubio pro reo" should be reversed ("in dubio in reum") in order to maintain high levels of cooperation in the population. 
Inclusion errors
Inclusion errors take place when transmission mistakes make negative reputations be understood by the listener as positive, i.e., a defector gains a positive reputation with probability q β . Indeed, the figures in panel 8, where we report the results with F = 0.5, n = 4, show that inclusion errors are more detrimental to cooperation, since they allow defectors to be accepted by different groups despite their anti-social behaviour, thus lowering the global level of cooperation in the system.
V. DISCUSSION
Gossip is a key ingredient for the functioning of human societies, but its importance in evolutionary models of cooperation is largely underrated. We developed a model of gossip-based cooperation with the aim of addressing three challenges related to the evolution of cooperation: 1. the impact of quantity and quality of gossip; 2. the effect of network structure; 3. the interaction between the first two factors and group size. We found that the more information agents can exchange, the more accurate they become in selecting reliable partners, even when groups are pretty unstable. However, the role of gossip abundance is modulated by group size: in small groups (n = 4) at least five gossip stages are required to make cooperators outcompete defectors, whereas in large groups (n = 20) two gossip phases are enough to gather and make good use of reported information. This finding complements results obtained in lab experiments where the abundance of gossip was effective in optimizing human responses, and in directing cooperation towards cooperators in an indirect-reciprocity games [37] .
Varying the quantity of gossip exchanged by agents led to an increase in cooperation rates, meaning that gossip quantity is important, but false information might hinder cooperation, especially in the case of erroneous inclusions of defectors. For instance, when reporting information about a third party, mistakes in transmission could lead either to exclude cooperators, or to include defectors. An inclusive error would lead to accept defectors who are mistakenly considered good, whereas an exclusive error would penalize erroneously negatively-reputed cooperators. We were able to show that excluding cooperators made cooperation emerge slowly, but in groups of 20 individuals it nonetheless went to 1. Unlike previous work [28, 38, 39] , we are not interested in errors in evaluations, which might consist in the application of the wrong social norm, but in transmission errors and their effects on groups' decision making. Another crucial element for supporting cooperation is the interaction between group-size and a bi-partite graph, whose combination was very effective in isolating defectors. According to Nowak and May [40] , in computational models of the evolution of cooperation, the structure of interactions among individuals, i.e., the topology of the network on which they interact, could be an important factor enhancing the emergence of cooperation even though at the individual level this strategy results detrimental. A great deal of studies on evolutionary game theory on graphs were spawned by this first, key insight [41] [42] [43] [44] , making it clear that many factors can favour, or hinder, global cooperative behaviours. When agents playing a PGG are placed on a bipartite graph with image score opportunities [36] , cooperation can emerge and be maintained, also for different group sizes [22] . This happens because the combination of a bi-partite graph structure, implying partner selection, and the possibility of identifying cooperators through image score result in cooperative strategies invading the population and completely out competing defectors.
Early small-scale experiments suggested that network topology may actually enhance cooperative strategies in controlled laboratory situations [45] [46] [47] . Though, larger-scale and more in-depth studies and reviews [48] [49] [50] [51] showed that there is no significant influence of the interaction network on the emergence and evolution of cooperation in behavioural experiments using a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG). Analogously, [33] analytically demonstrated that bipartite networks with PGG are very effective in fostering pro-social behaviours.
We found that partner choice was crucial and when there were less opportunities to avoid defectors, especially in small groups, cooperation levels decreased dramatically. On a bi-partite structure, failing to ostracise defectors resulted in and to investigate the impact of gossip on such a structure.
By linking the results on gossip, in terms of both quantity and quality, with the data on ostracism on a bi-partite graph, we provide tentative support for our hypothesized relationship between reported evaluations, i.e., gossip, and cooperation. Even when is not reliable, gossip can still contribute to the emergence of cooperation in a mixed population where defectors can take advantage of others' contributions but they become ostracised when the group is informed about their choices.
